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RECENT APPROACHES TO THE TRADE OR BUSINESS 
REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 174: UNAUTHORIZED SNOW 
REMOVAL 
Daniel S. Goldberg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code is a "tax incentive" 
provision designed by Congress to encourage investment in start-
up research and development activities by permitting a current tax 
deduction for expenditures which would otherwise be considered 
capital expenditures. As with many tax incentive provisions, one 
might quarrel with the wisdom of using the tax code to encourage 
specific activities or expenditures and a strong argument could cer-
tainly be made against Congressional enactment of that kind of 
expenditure. Exercising its legislative prerogative, however, Con-
gress chose otherwise, and it is the responsibility of the Depart-
ment of the Treasury and the courts to carry out the legislative 
will of Congress. 
Like many tax-incentive provisions of the Code, however, section 
17 4 has inspired its share of abusive tax shelters formed solely to 
generate artificial tax losses. Several of those shelters have found 
their way to the Tax Court and a few appellate courts. Instead of 
focusing on the abusive aspects of those cases, however, courts 
have often issued very broadly-written opinions. In doing so, they 
may have planted the seeds for virtually precluding the availability 
of section 17 4 for all but established companies, in contravention 
of Congress' clear legislative intent. 
The leading cases share the same basic fact pattern. A partner-
ship (or S corporation) engages in questionable research activities, 
but prior to the time any research is actually done, the entity, in 
substance, disposes of any interest it may have in the new technol-
ogy in exchange for a stream of royalty payments from a licensee. 
Generally, the licensee is either the company that has also been 
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hired to do the research or an affiliate of that company.1 
In these cases, the courts have correctly held that the taxpayers 
did not incur research and development expenses in connection 
with a trade or business and, therefore, were not entitled to a cur-
rent deduction for their purported research and development ex-
penses. The licensee firms, which owned the technology, incurred 
the expenses of research and development rather than the taxpay-
ers. Any opportunity the taxpayers had to engage in a trade or 
business involving the creation or exploitation of the new technol-
ogy was precluded by the licensing of the technology prior to any 
research expenses which the taxpayer might have incurred. 
In several recent technical advice memoranda and in cases in lit-
igation, however, the Internal Revenue Service has indicated that 
it will attempt to broaden the scope of ~he disallowance to situa-
tions in which the technology has not been pre-sold. 2 The Service's 
attempts have been bolstered by judicial opinions in which the 
courts have not been content to rest their analyses on easily sup-
portable grounds,3 choosing instead to focus on the "trade or busi-
ness" issue. In doing so, the courts have clouded the clear guidance 
on the "trade or business" issue under section 17 4 provided by the 
Supreme Court in Snow v. Commissioner" and have thereby set 
the tax law back fifteen years by creating unwarranted uncertainty 
on the law. This article asserts that the Supreme Court would have 
reversed its holding in Snow if it had applied the literal applica-
tion of the post-Snow decisions. Accordingly, that language should 
be disregarded as inconsistent with Snow. 
As a starting point for the analysis, this article examines the leg-
islative history of section 17 4 and the historical background of 
Snow. After a discussion of the Snow case, the article reviews the 
1 See Green v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 667 (1984) (research contractor received an imme-
diately effective and comprehensive right to exploit any technology it developed) and its 
progeny Spellman v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 298 (1986), affd, 845 F.2d 148 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (the license agreement was entered into prior to the research activity and pre-
cluded the taxpayer from entering the business area in which the research was to be con-
ducted) and Levin v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 698 (1986), affd, 832 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(upon execution of the research and development interest the exploitation rights were si-
multaneously sold). 
• See Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,802,007 (September 30, 1987); Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,749,006 (Au-
gust 14, 1987); Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,725,001 (March 10, 1987). 
• See infra notes 28 to 51 and accompanying text . 
• 416 u.s. 500 (1974). 
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post-Snow decisions and their discussion of the "trade or business" 
issue. Next, to prevent the loose reasoning of the post-Snow opin-
ions from obliterating section 17 4's true purpose, the article sug-
gests the proper mode of analysis of the "trade or business" issue 
under section 17 4. Finally, a hypothetical is used to demonstrate 
the correctness and efficacy of the article's proposed analysis. The 
implications of the analysis and discussion, however, extend far be-
yond section 174. The implications underscore the importance of 
careful reasoning in tax cases and the need to avoid analysis based 
solely upon the "smell test."~ 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 17 4 AND THE Snow 
CASE 
Section 174(a)(1) provides, "A taxpayer may treat research or 
experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred by him dur-
ing the taxable year in connection with his trade or business as 
expenses which are not chargeable to capital account. The expend-
itures so treated shall be allowed as a deduction."6 In general, ex-
penditures for the creation of an asset must be capitalized and 
added to the basis of that asset. 7 Thus, under general principles of 
capitalization, research expenses would not be currently deductible 
but rather would have to be capitalized as a cost of the technology 
or patent. Section 17 4, however, by election of the taxpayer, pro-
vides two functions: (1) it allows a current deduction for an expen-
diture that would otherwise have to be capitalized and included in 
the basis of the technology developed; and (2) it allows a current 
deduction for what otherwise would constitute pre-opening ex-
penses. Even before the enactment of section 17 4, the Commis-
sioner accepted the currently deductible nature of research costs in 
the context of an ongoing business if it was consistent with the 
taxpayer's method of accounting. Section 17 4, in part, codified the 
Commissioner's position. 8 The Internal Revenue Service's and re-
. • See infra notes 28 to 51 and accompanying text. 
• I.R.C. §174{a)(l). 
7 See I.R.C. §263{b). 
• The Treasury's original position regarding research expenditures was very similar to the 
treatment currently provided in § 17 4 regarding that aspect. Article 168 of Regulations 45, 
62 and 65 provided: 
A taxpayer who has incurred expenses in his business for designs, drawings, patterns, 
models, or work of an experimental nature calculated to result in improvement of his 
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cent court attacks on research and development expense deduc-
tions, however, appear to focus on the latter of the two functions of 
the section. 
The key consideration is that these attacks should not hinder 
the primary purpose for which section 17 4 was enacted, which is to 
encourage research and development expenditures by smaller en-
terprises.9 Section 174 was enacted to cure a problem which Presi-
dent Eisenhower summarized in his budget message to Congress in 
1954: 
At present, companies are often not permitted to deduct currently 
for research or development expenses. This rule is especially bur-
densome to small concerns because large companies with estab-
lished research laboratories can usually get immediate deductions. 
I recommend that all companies be given an option to capitalize or 
to write-off currently their expenses arising from research and de-
velopment work. Our tradition of initiative and rapid technical im-
facilities or his product, may at his option deduct such expenses from gross income 
for the taxable year in which they are incurred or treat such articles as a capital asset 
to the extent of the amount so expended. 
Reg. 65, Art. 168 (1924). 
The option provided by the Treasury in 1924, however, was short-lived. In 1925, the 
Board of Tax Appeals rendered two decisions which led to the withdrawal of the option to 
deduct or capitalize. In both of these cases, taxpayers who had previously deducted research 
expenses as ordinary and necessary expenses attempted to retroactively change their 
method of accounting and capitalize their research and experimental expenditures. See 
Goodell-Pratt Co. v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 30 (1925); See also Gilliam Mfg. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 1 B.T.A. 967 (1925). The Board of Tax Appeals sided with the taxpayer in both 
cases. As Judge Trammell stated: "The taxpayer has no option to treat expense items as 
capital or capital expenditures as ordinary and necessary expenses of carrying on a trade or 
business and had a right, as it did, to change its erroneous accounting methods." Gilliam 
Mfg. Co., 1 B.T.A. at 970. 
Apparently, the Service still believed in the wisdom of allowing a current deduction for 
research expenditures, but was unwilling to permit taxpayers to retroactively change their 
method of accounting in order to take advantage of more valuable deductions after a tax 
rate increase. In 1952, the Commissioner stated that the policy of the Service was to allow a 
deduction of research costs in cases in which the taxpayer had adopted a practice of expens-
ing them under its "established method of accounting." Commissioner's statement to the 
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 525 CCH 1!6170 (April 4, 1952). The appar-
ently unintended implication of the Commissioner's statement was that in order to cur-
rently deduct research costs, a business must have had a history of research and develop-
ment expenditures. The implication resulted in discrimination against small or beginning 
businesses, and that discrimination was the primary motivating force behind the legislative 
response embodied in § 17 4. 
• See infra notes 10 through 13 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 8 Va. Tax Rev. 865 1988-1989
1989] Unauthorized Snow Removal 865 
provements must not be hampered by adverse tax rules.10 
During debate on section 174's passage, Congressman Reed, then 
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, aptly 
stated the important rule which Congress intended for the section: 
Very often, under present law, small businesses which are develop-
ing new products and do not have established research depart-
ments are not allowed to deduct these expenses despite the fact 
that their large and well established competitors can obtain the de-
duction. . . . This provision will greatly stimulate the search for 
new products and new inventions upon which the future economic 
and military strength of our Nation depends. It will be particularly 
valuable to small and growing businesses.11 
Section 174, however, went further than merely codifying ex-
isting law. Section 174, like section 162(2 requires a "trade or busi-
ness" to support a deduction. Unlike section 162, however, which 
requires a taxpayer to be engaged in "carrying on" a trade or busi-
ness, section 174 requires only the lesser standard that the expen-
diture be "in connection with" a trade or business. Section 174 al-
lows a current deduction for expenses that would be regarded as 
"start-up" expenses for purposes of section 162.13 
•• Budget Message, 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1557, 1567. 
11 H.R. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d. Sess., 100 Cong. Rec. 3425 (1954). 
12 Section 162 provides, in part, "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary 
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business. . . . " 
13 The Congressional discussions during consideration of §174 indicated that Congress in-
tended to provide special favorable treatment for start-up expenses in the nature of research 
and development expenses. Congress did this in order to prevent discrimination against tax-
payers engaged in research activities without ongoing businesses and provide an incentive 
for small or beginning businesses to engage in research and development work. 
The report of the House Ways and Means Committee on General Revenue Revision, 83rd 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) echoed this theme: 
The present policy is helpful only to taxpayers which have a prior practice of expens-
ing such costs. It discriminates against all others, including new taxpayers. In order to 
avoid discrimination and treat all taxpayers on an equal basis, irrespective of past 
accounting practices, the Internal Revenue Code should ... be amended to give all 
taxpayers the option to expense or capitalize research and development expenditures. 
Id. at 944. 
See also the resolution adopted by the Council of State Chambers of Commerce, which 
was made a part of the House Ways and Means Committee Report on General Revenue 
Revision, at 958 and which states: "A wider latitude in the allowance of depreciation, obso-
lescence, and the research type of costs would encourage the development of new enter-
prises, the promotion of new products, and the expansion of production and employment." 
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The seminal judicial interpretation of section 17 4 was Snow u. 
Commissioner14 in which the taxpayer was a limited partner in the 
Burns Investment Company, which was a partnership formed to 
develop a special purpose incinerator. The partnership had made 
expenditures in connection with the development of the incinera-
tor and had thereby incurred losses in the year at issue. 111 
The partnership deducted these expenditures under section 
174(a)(1) of the Code, which allows a taxpayer to take as a deduc-
tion "experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred by him 
during the taxable year in connection with his trade or business as 
expenses which are not chargeable to capital account."16 The part-
nership, however, had made no sales of incinerators in the year at 
issue.17 
The Service disallowed as a deduction the taxpayer's distributive 
share of the partnership's net operating loss on the grounds that 
the partnership was not yet engaged in a trade or business during 
the year at issue. The Supreme Court, noting the many references 
to the words "trade or business" throughout the Code, held that 
the taxpayer was entitled to his distributive share of partnership 
losses because the partnership had incurred those expenses "in 
connection with" its trade or business.18 
I d. at 958. See also the remarks of Representative Camp, Revenue Revision Act, 82nd Cong., 
1st. Sess., 97 Cong. Rec. 4326 (1951): 
I d. 
In order to clarify the existing confusion in respect of the tax treatment of such ex-
penditures, and to prevent tax discrimination between large businesses having contin-
uous programs of research and small or beginning business enterprises, [§174] pro-
vides generally that expenditures made in industrial or commercial research ... may, 
at the election of the taxpayer, be deducted as expenses or capitalized and charged 
off over a period selected and designated by the taxpayer. 
The Treasury Department also understood that the intended purpose of §174 was to en-
courage research by new or small business enterprises. During the course of the enactment 
of the 1954 Code, Undersecretary Marian B. Folsom presented a summary of the principal 
provisions of H.R. 8300 to the Senate Finance Committee. During this presentation, he indi-
cated that the existing treatment of research and experimental expenditures discouraged 
research and was "(e]specially restrictive for small businesses" and that §174 would "(h]elp 
small, pioneering businesses." Senate Finance Committee Hearing on H.R. 8300, 83rd Cong., 
2nd Sess. 105 (April 7, 1954) . 
.. 416 u.s. 500 (1974). 
'" See id. 
16 I.R.C. § 174(a)(l). 
17 See 416 U.S. at 502. 
16 See id. at 503-04. 
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In the Court's view, the phrase "in connection with" contained 
in section 17 4 of the Code, encompasses activities engaged in by 
the taxpayer in the area of research and development, even though 
the taxpayer has not yet begun the actual sale of products it devel-
oped. 19 The Court reasoned that a more relaxed standard for de-
ductibility under section 174 than under section 162 emanated 
from Congress' intent to equalize treatment with regard to re-
search and development expenditures between rich taxpayers and 
poor taxpayers. 20 
In the Supreme Court's view, to have required taxpayers to be 
already engaged in activities of selling products to qualify for the 
research and development deduction would have caused disallow-
ance of deductions for small businesses which are developing new 
products and do not yet have established research departments. 
Nonetheless, large and well established competitors would have 
been allowed deductions for those same expenditures. 21 Such a re-
sult would have been unusual and inappropriate for a provision 
which was designed specifically with small and growing businesses 
in mind.22 
•• See id. at 503. The sale of goods and services is no longer a prerequisite to deductibility 
under § 162. See infra notes 63 to 70 and accompanying text. 
•• See 416 U.S. at 503 . 
., See id. at 504. 
•• See id. at 503-04. Although the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 17 4 reveals one 
pervasive theme which is that § 17 4 was intended to encourage research and development 
work by "small or beginning business enterprises" in start-up situations- several courts, 
including the Tax Court, were not willing to give such broad effect to the new section after 
its enactment. See generally, Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses and Section 174: Will Snow 
Fall?,. 27 Tax Lawyer 381 (1974) (discussing the history of §174 prior to the Snow decision). 
In 1960, and again in 1961, the Tax Court had an opportunity to apply §174 to new enter-
prises. In Cleveland v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 517 (1960), affd in part, rev'd in part, 297 
F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1961), the taxpayer, Cleveland, had been advancing funds to an inventor 
attempting to develop an inorganic liquid binder for at least 12 years prior to the enactment 
of §174. Prompted by the enactment of §174, Cleveland and Kerla, the inventor, entered 
into a "trust agreement" in 1956, reducing their understanding to writing. The agreement 
provided that the inventor was to spend his full time working on the invention and that 
Cleveland held a one-half interest in the invention. The Tax Court held that the agreement 
failed to create a partnership or joint venture and, therefore, Cleveland was not engaged in 
business with Kerla. ld. Instead, the Tax Court held that the funds advanced by Cleveland 
subsequent to the written agreement were lo,m,; to the inventor. ld. 
In partially reversing the Tax Court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated, "if there was a joint venture in which both men were active participants, the 
actual expenditures by Kerla for research and experimentation could be deducted by Cleve-
land since they were incurred in connection with his trade or business." Cleveland, 297 F.2d 
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The Supreme Court did not explicitly set forth the meaning of 
at 172. The Court went on to hold that the parties were involved in a joint venture and that 
the funds advanced subsequent to the agreement were deductible under §174: "In this in-
stance the decision of the parties to the agreement to define their relationship so as to take 
advantage of the benefits of the statute was in harmony with the purpose of the enactment 
to encourage expenditures for research and experimentation." Id. at 173. 
The facts of Cleveland do not indicate that the invention was ever actually marketed or 
that any patent was applied for. Yet the Court of Appeals did not question the existence of 
a trade or business as that term is used in § 17 4. (The continuing nature of the equal co-
ownership in Cleveland has recently been used to distinguish Cleveland from other research 
and development cases on the grounds that the capital partner did not retain a significant 
ownership interest after the research contractor licensed the technology. See infra note 114 
and accompanying text. 
Before the appellate court issued its opinion in Cleveland, the Tax Court was confronted 
with another new enterprise case under §174 in Koons v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1092 
(1961). Koons had purchased all rights to an invention which was in a stage of very early 
development. Koons then contracted with the seller, a research laboratory, to complete the 
development work. The Service challenged Koons' deductions for research expenditures 
under § 17 4 as not incurred in connection with a trade or business. The Tax Court held that 
the term "trade or business" as contemplated in §174 required a "going" or "existing" trade 
or business. ld. at 1100. Interestingly, the Court cited only those portions of the legislative 
history which did not refer to "new" or "beginning" enterprises. The Tax Court then analo-
gized to cases decided under §162 and concluded that the developmental expenditures in-
volved in Koons were not made in connection with an existing trade or business, and there-
fore were not deductible. ld. at 1101. 
It was against that background that the case of Snow v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 585 (1972) 
reached the Tax Court. In that case the taxpayer, Snow, was one of three limited partners in 
the Burns Investment Company partnership. The partnership was formed in July of 1966 by 
Trott, an inventor, in order to secure funds necessary for further development of a new type 
of incinerator. Trott contributed all right, title and interest in the incinerator to the part-
nership, and the limited partners contributed capital. Burns Investment Company hired 
Crossbow, Inc. to perform all the shop work necessary for further development of the incin-
erator. Id. On its 1966 tax return, Burns Investment Company reported a net operating loss 
in excess of $36,000. During 1966, Burns Investment Company was not involved in selling 
the incinerator or any other product. On these facts the Tax Court held that the expendi-
tures paid in 1966 were not incurred "in connection with" the trade or business of the part-
nership since the partnership was not in a trade or business in 1966. The court stated, "In 
1966 Trott had hardly begun experimentation upon the trash burner, the application for a 
patent was not made until 1968, the advance of funds was made only in 1966 and no effort 
to market or sell the device was attempted until several years later." Id. at 595. Citing its 
earlier decision in Koons, the Tax Court found that since Burns Investment Company "was 
not holding itself out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services[,]" the research 
expenditures were not incurred in connection with an existing trade or business. ld. at 597. 
Thus, the Tax Court extended its holding in Koons to incorporate the full "trade or busi-
ness" test of §162. 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the imposition of the trade or business require-
ment of §162. The court stated, "[i]t seems clear to us, as it did to the Tax Court, that 
Burns Investment Company in 1966 was not holding itself out to others as being engaged in 
the selling of goods and services." 482 F.2d 1029, 1031 (1973). The court held that the ex-
penses incurred by Burns Investment Company in 1966 were "pre-operating" expenses and, 
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the "trade or business" language in section 174. The outcome in 
Snow, however, suggests a liberal application of the term. Under 
the Snow decision, section 174 does not require that the taxpayer 
be engaged in carrying on a trade or business. In 1966, the year in 
issue, the Burns Partnership had no office, telephone, or separate 
facility of any kind. No patent had been applied for, and the part-
nership itself did no work on the invention. Instead, the partner-
ship hired a company owned by the general partner to perform en-
gineering and development services. 23 Although the regulations 
under section 174 provide that a deduction will be allowed for ex-
penditures incurred on behalf of the taxpayer by another person or 
organization, in Snow, there was no written contract between the 
partnership and the company performing the development 
services. 24 
More importantly, under Snow, a taxpayer need not ever carry 
on a trade or business within the meaning of section 162. Snow 
conceded that the partners had not made any marketing efforts on 
behalf of the Burns Partnership in 1966. In fact, the partnership 
never made any attempt to market the product at all. Before a 
patent was issued in 1970, the partnership incorporated to produce 
thus, were not deductible under §174. Id. at 1032. When confronted with the legislative 
history of §174, the Court stated: "We cannot hold that the comment previously quoted 
from Representative Camp concerning 'beginning enterprises' demonstrates a Congressional 
intent to set aside the settled interpretation of the language 'trade or business' as used in 
§174." Id. at 1032. This holding by the Sixth Circuit created a clear conflict with the holding 
of the Fourth Circuit in Cleveland, and thus set the stage for review by the Supreme Court. 
In his brief to the Supreme Court in Snow, the Commissioner argued that by incorporat-
ing the "trade or business" language in §174, Congress made clear its intent to incorporate 
the "trade or business" requirement of §162. Brief for the Respondent at 11, Snow v. Com-
missioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974). However, the Commissioner failed to recognize the language 
in § 174 which distinguishes it from all other Code sections. Section 174 provides a deduction 
for research expenditures "in connection with" a taxpayer's trade or business. In contrast, 
§162 provides a deduction for "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the 
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business(emphasis added)." It was precisely that 
distinction that formed the basis for the Supreme Court's opinion. 
The Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the Commissioner and held that the lan-
guage and requirements of §162 were "not helpful" in construing §174. 416 U.S. at 503. In a 
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the legislative history of §174. In 
the Court's opinion, imposing the stringent standards of §162 upon the more liberal provi-
sion of §174, would result in the same discrimination that Congress intended to alleviate by 
enacting §174. ld. at 504. 
•• See Brief for Respondent at 5, 416 U.S. 500. 
•• See id. 
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and market the device.211 Thus, it is clear that the Burns Partner-
ship never engaged in carrying on a trade or business within the 
meaning of section 162 and perhaps never intended to do so. 
The Court, however, presupposed that Snow was in the pre-
opening phase of a trade or business without discussing what con-
stitutes that phase. In general, the pre-opening phase of a trade or 
business ends when the activities for which the enterprise was 
formed begin with a bona fide, good faith expectation of profit. 
Courts, however, differ regarding which events trigger the com-
mencement of these activities. 26 
The Service has recently begun to attack certain transactions as 
not being within the pre-opening stage of a trade or business be-
cause the taxpayer never intended to carry on a trade or business. 
It is on this critical issue that the Service has demonstrated its 
failure to understand the concept of "trade or business" and the 
Supreme Court's holding in Snow. 
III. Green AND ITS PROGENY: THE RECENT EROSION OF Snow 
For several years following the Snow decision, there were no de-
cided cases. The Service itself was silent. During those years, how-
ever, many research and development partnerships were formed 
based upon the holding of the Snow decision that a current deduc-
tion under section 17 4 did not require the taxpayer to be currently 
engaged in carrying on a trade or business. The Department of 
Commerce encouraged such ventures, providing blueprints for 
structuring them, virtually in kit form. 27 
In 1984, judicial silence came to an end with the Tax Court's 
decision in Green v. Commissioner,28 which formed the cornerstone 
of the Service's recent attacks on the "trade or business" issue. 
The Green case was followed by Spellman v. Commissioner29 and 
•• See id. at 5-6. 
•• See, e.g., Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874 (Cl. Ct. 1982); McManus v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C.M. 475 (1987); Richmond Television Corp. v. U.S., 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 
1965), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965). Presumably, future reg-
ulations promulgated under §195 will end this controversy. 
27 See e.g., Information and Steps Necessary to Form Research and Development Limited 
Partnerships, U.S. Department of Commerce, (December 31, 1983), P.B. 84-156058. 
•• 83 T.C. 667 (1984). 
•• 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 298 (1986), afrd, 845 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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Levin v. Commissioner,80 both of which were affirmed for the 
Commissioner on appeal, and by several subsequent Tax Court 
and Tax Court Memorandum cases.31 
The Green case involved a limited partnership ("LaSala") which 
in December of 1979 acquired four inventions from several inven-
tors. On the same day that the partnership acquired those inven-
tions, it executed a research and development agreement and an 
exclusive license agreement with a patent development company 
("NPDC"). Under the terms of the exclusive license agreement, 
NPDC was granted an immediate, worldwide license to commer-
cialize, manufacture, sell and otherwise exploit the inventions. 32 
LaSala claimed a deduction under section 174 for research and ex-
perimental expenditures in the amount of $650,000, which it paid 
for further development of the inventions during the period after 
the effective date of the licensing agreement. 
The Service challenged LaSala's deductions for research and de-
velopment expenses because those expenditures related to a period 
after the date of the disposition of the inventions to NPDC under 
30 87 T.C. 698 (1986), affd, 832 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1987). 
31 See, e.g., Diamond v. Commissioner, 92 Curr. Tax Ct. Reg. Dec. (CCH) No. 25, Dec. 
45,497 (1989)(deduction denied when option could be exercised wwithout cost and partner-
ship was otherwise precluded from obtaining a patent for the device developed); Moore v. 
Commissioner, T.C.M. 1989·38 (January 24, 1989)(Partnership denied deductions under 
§ 17 4 for suspect research in a transaction devoid of profit motive to the partnership and in 
which the option to license the resulting technology was prearranged or a foregone conclu-
sion). McManus v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 475 (1987), affd, 865 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 
1988)(S corporation that purportedly was to conduct research on developing a prototype 
mud logging device, which had precluded itself from all activities to exploit the technology, 
like the partnership in the Green case, was denied research and development expense de-
duction) and Property Growth Company v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1072 
(1988)(sustained Commissioner's disallowance of the taxpayer's research and development 
expense deduction). See also, Ben-Avi v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 199 (1988) (con-
temporaneous license precluded trade or business); Goulding v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 846 (1988) (expenditures for research in ginsing cultivation disallowed where part-
nership retained no rights in the technology). Other cases involving suspect research have 
been decided against taxpayers based upon lack of profit motive. See e.g., Mack v. Commis-
sioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 735 (1988) (expenditures for development of a calorie consumption 
monitor, "DietMate", disallowed on the basis of lack of profit motive where research, if any, 
was suspect, and transactions allegedly involved a Virgin Island partnership, a Hong Kong 
research contractor, and financing from a Swiss bank without documentation); Myslisz v. 
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 818 (1988) (profit motive lacking where the taxpayer 
owned the technology, but failed to monitor the progress of the research, could not realize a 
profit without tax benefits and where the technology was not "stand alone" technology). 
32 See 83 T.C. at 668-72. 
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the terms of the exclusive license agreement. 33 The Tax Court held 
that the exclusive license agreement between LaSala and NPDC 
constituted a sale of those inventions. 34 Because the sale took place 
before LaSala made its research and development expenditures, 
these research costs were not expended in the partnership's behalf. 
Rather, the court stated that these expenditures represented an ac-
quisition cost of NPDC's promise to pay a stream of royalties to 
LaSala. The LaSala partnership could never enjoy the benefits of 
the research, other than through royalty participation, because it 
had already divested itself of all rights to the inventions. More-
over, the Tax Court held that the expenditures could not have 
been made "in connection with" any trade or business because, 
prior to making these expenditures, the partnership had precluded 
itself from entering into a trade or business through the exploita-
tion of the research. 311 Nor could LaSala be considered to be in the 
trade or business of research for future exploitation because it had 
already sold its rights to any product that might arise from the 
research. 36 Therefore, based on the simultaneous purchase and sale 
agreements through which LaSala sold the very technology it 
claimed to be developing, the Tax Court concluded that the part-
nership had carried on solely investment activities because it func-
tioned only "as a vehicle for injecting risk capital into the develop-
ment and commercialization" of the inventions.37 
Research and development activity, whether done by a partner 
or someone else for the LaSala partnership, clearly would have es-
tablished the partnership as being engaged in a trade or business if 
those activities were done on the partnership's behalf. In the 
Green case, however, the activities were engaged in on behalf of 
NPDC, the licensing corporation, rather than the partnership. 
Therefore, those activities did not establish the partnership in the 
trade or business. 
Since the research activities were not done on LaSala's behalf, 
the court examined the other activities of the partnership to deter-
mine whether those activities were sufficient to constitute a trade 
•• Id. at 678. 
•• Id. at 684. 
•• Id. at 685-91. 
•• Id. at 691. 
•• I d. at 687. 
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or business. Those activities, however, consisted purely of ministe-
rial activities such as maintaining bank accounts and making de-
posits.38 The court likened LaSala's royalty interest in the develop-
ment and commercialization of the inventions to that of an 
investor in securities. The partnership had no ownership interest 
in the inventions and no control over their actual development, 
production or marketing. Rather, the partnership only maintained 
an interest in the investment because the purchase price under the 
license agreement was contingent upon future sales by the 
licensee. 39 
The Tax Court's opinion in the Green case, however, is far from 
a model of clarity. The language of the opinion could be read to 
give the investment factors discussed by the court significance in-
dependent of the simultaneous licensing arrangement on which the 
court based its conclusion that the taxpayer had no trade or busi-
ness. To grasp the importance of the Green case, one must ex-
amine it in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Snow. Given 
such an analysis, the simultaneity of the licensing and research and 
development agreements takes on crucial significance. 
Two later Tax Court cases, Spellman v. Commissioner"0 and 
Levin v. Commissioner41 expressed the significance of this relation-
ship much more clearly. Indeed, these cases indicate that a tax-
payer's entitlement to a research and development deduction 
under section 174 of the Code will depend on whether that tax-
payer has, in effect, sold (i.e., licensed on an exclusive basis) the 
technology prior to the conduct of the research activity. 
In Spellman, the taxpayer was a limited partner in a partnership 
created to invest in another limited partnership, Sci-Med, which 
was formed for the purpose of engaging in the research, develop-
ment and exploitation of certain antibiotic drugs. An Israeli phar-
maceutical company, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. 
("Teva"), agreed to undertake a research and development pro-
gram for Sci-Med under a sub-research and development agree-
ment. On the same day the parties entered into the research and 
development agreement, Sci-Med granted Teva the sole and exclu-
•• ld. at 688. 
•• Id. at 688-89. 
•• 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 298 (1986), affd 845 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1988) . 
., 87 T.C. 698 (1986), affd, 832 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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sive worldwide license to manufacture and sell the products that 
resulted from the technology developed as well as the right to sub-
license the technology.'2 
The Tax Court held that Sci-Med was not entitled to any re-
search and development deduction under section 174 of the Code."3 
In so holding, the court clearly identified the simultaneous re-
search and exclusive license agreements as the single significant 
factual finding because the simultaneity of these agreements en-
sured that all of Sci-Med's rights to. the technology developed 
would belong to Teva even before research was conducted. As a 
result, any research conducted pursuant to the research agreement 
would necessarily be for the benefit and account of Teva rather 
than Sci-Med. Accordingly, Sci-Med could not be entitled to the 
section 17 4 deduction. Indeed, as the court itself stated: 
Since the exclusive license agreement was entered into by Sci-Med 
prior to the commencement of any research or experimental activi-
ties, Sci-Med was effectively precluded from ever having a substan-
tial right in the results of the said activities, and from ever using 
the results of the research or experimental activities in connection 
with its own trade or business, present or future. Sci-Med's role 
was exclusively that of a financing vehicle, injecting risk capital 
into the venture. Its activities never, and could have never, sur-
passed those of an investor. •• 
As the above-quoted passage from the Court's opinion indicates, 
the existence of current trade or business activities or even the as-
surance of future trade or business activities by the taxpayer is not 
the essential factor in determining whether a taxpayer's research 
expenditures were made "in connection with a trade or business." 
Rather, the ability to engage in a trade or business in the future is 
the touchstone. 
In affirming the decision of the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit emphasized the importance of the pre-li-
censing by pointing out that "the plan might have worked if Sci-
Med had had good prospects of entering the pharmaceutical busi-
ness.""11 However, the pre-licensing of virtually all of the technol-
.. 52 T.C.M. (CCH) at 300-01. 
•• ld. at 310 . 
.. Id. at 307. 
•• Spellman v. Commissioner,845 F.2d. at 151. 
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ogy, other than "by-products" (which were subject to an option ex-
ercisable for only $20,000), prevented Sci-Med, as a practical 
matter, from ever entering the pharmaceuticals business.46 
In the Spellman case, as in the Green case, the taxpayer's exclu-
sive license of virtually all of the technology to another firm prior 
to the actual research precluded the taxpayer from ever carrying 
on a trade or business in connection with the technology devel-
oped. One may fairly infer from both the Spellman and Green 
opinions that, but for the preclusion of any future exploitation of 
the technology engendered in the pre-licensing agreement, the tax-
payer's position would have been sustained. 
Similarly in Levin v. Commissioner,47 the taxpayer, a limited 
partner in a partnership organized to develop, manufacture, and 
market food packaging systems, sought a section 174 deduction 
even though the partnership had simultaneously executed a re-
search, manufacturing, and marketing agreement with another 
firm. The Commissioner contended that the partnership was pre-
cluded by contractual arrangements and by design from ever en-
gaging in any trade or business. The. court articulated the question 
as follows: "[W]e must decide only whether the partnerships were 
engaged, at any time, in the trade or business in connection with 
which funds were expended for research and . experimentation 
within the meaning of section 174."48 Under the court's formula-
tion of the issue, the Commissioner prevailed because the simulta-
neous execution of the manufacturing, marketing and development 
agreements effectively precluded the taxpayer's partnership from 
being "capable of ever engaging in trades or businesses."49 The 
manufacturing and marketing agreements, which may or may not 
have effected sales of the packaging machinery inventions, effec-
tively deprived the partnership of control over the manufacture, 
use and sale of the developed machines for virtually the entire life 
of the partnership. In the absence of these agreements, however, 
the court could not have concluded that the partnership would or 
could never enter into a trade or business in the future. 60 
•• Id. 
•• 87 T.C. 698 (1986), aff'd, 832 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1987). 
•• Id. at 725. 
•• ld. See also id. at 726-28. 
•• In its opinion in Levin, the court looked past the technical and legal issues involved in 
the case, and instead emphasized that the research at issue was suspect. The court's interest 
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in dis-
tinguishing Snow, emphasized that the partnership in Snow in-
vested in the development of the ideas of its general partner, an 
inventor. Moreover, the court stated that in Snow, "the partner-
ship expected to produce and sell the machines itself, if develop-
ment efforts were successful."111 In contrast, the partnerships in 
Levin were formed only to supply cash so that inventions could be 
developed by others. Further, the general partner was not an in-
ventor and had no experience with food machinery. 
Thus, the facts of the case, in the court's view, contained four 
serious obstacles that the taxpayer needed to overcome in order to 
prevail. First, the research was suspect. Second, the accrued deduc-
tion for research services was based upon a future liability stated 
in declining currency. Third, the general partner of the partnership 
was not an inventor. Fourth, the partnership never actually in-
tended to sell the inventions in Israel or anywhere else.152 
The courts in Green, Spellman, and Levin all reached the ap-
propriate result. The language in the opinions of these cases, how-
was also piqued by the method of payment under the several agreements, which suggested a 
currency-swap arbitrage. The taxpayer sought an accrual for the current value of a liability 
payable in Israeli currency several years in the future. Because of the rate of inflation and 
decline of the Israeli currency, it was predictable, almost to a certainty, that the value in 
U.S. dollars of the contractual liability would be substantially less than the original accrual. 
The accrual is significant because it overstates the true amount of the liability for future 
payment in U.S. dollars. 87 T.C. at 716-20. 
Under §461(h), the test for determining when an expense is deductible for an accrual 
method taxpayer is the "all events test." Under the all events test, in general, an expense of 
an accrual method taxpayer is deductible in the taxable year in which: (1) "all the events 
have occurred which determine the fact of the liability;" and (2) the amount of the liability 
"can be determined with reasonable accuracy." See also Treas.Reg. §1.461-1(a)(2). 
The amount of the §461(h) deduction is the face amount of the liability for future pay-
ment, without discounting to present value. The rule has substantial support in the case law 
dating back almost to the inception of the income tax laws. See, e.g., United States v. An-
derson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926); Lawyer's Title Guarantee Fund v. United States, 508 F.2d 1 
(5th Cir. 1975). It recently has been reaffirmed by the Tax Court in Burnhaum Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 953 (1988)(accrual of estimated amount of settlement payments was 
proper where the settlement agreement specified the amount of each monthly payment 
which was to be paid until the death of the payee and taxpayer used actuarial tables to 
determine life expectancy). In Levin as well as other Green progeny, by previous license 
agreement, the taxpayer had precluded itself from ever engaging in any trade or business 
with regard to the technology because the technology was developed at a time when the 
taxpayer had no ownership interest in it. 
•• 832 F.2d at 405, citing Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974). 
•• See id. 
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ever, was imprecise and overly broad, suggesting an improper anal-
ysis which could undermine the Congressional purpose for enacting 
section 17 4. 
IV. A SuGGESTED ANALYSIS oF THE TRADE OR BusiNESS IssuE 
UNDER SECTION 17 4. 
The critical fact in the Green case and its progeny was that the 
taxpayers were in all respects non-participants. From the inception 
of the transactions, none of the participants was ever going to own 
or exploit the technology. All of the situations represented merely 
financing devices disguised by meaningless agreements. In that 
sense, they were similar to typical sale-leaseback financing ar-
rangements. Under those arrangements, the nominal ownership of 
the lessor is ignored for tax purposes. Instead, the lessee is entitled 
to the tax benefits of the arrangement, such as depreciation deduc-
tions, because he bears the benefits and burdens of ownership.63 
Section 17 4 was not designed to artificially shift deductions for re-
search and development expenses, and the transactions in Green 
and its progeny represented crude attempts to do just that. 
Yet, several of these cases appear to rest their decisions more 
generally on the taxpayer's lack of a trade or business, rather then 
simply the circularity of the transactions and the taxpayer's lack of 
ownership of the technology. To the extent that these decisions 
rely on the "trade or business" analysis, they are misleading. Ac-
•• See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 
1985)(purchase of used computer equipment with recourse and nonrecourse notes for price 
in excess of fair market value followed by leaseback was a sham lacking economic sub-
stance); Beck v. Commissioner, 678 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1982)(partnership denied interest 
deduction where purchase price and nonrecourse indebtedness incurred by the partnership 
greatly exceeded the fair market value of property securing the debt); Hilton v. Commis-
sioner 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982)(purchase-leaseback was 
not a genuine multi-party transaction with economic substance where there was no possibil-
ity of economic profit or gain); Sun Oil v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1977)(conveyance of 320 parcels of unimproved service station sites at 
cost to a tax-exempt trust, with leaseback, was mere financing transaction where lessee bore 
all risks and burdens of ownership of the property and guaranteed a fixed return); Johns v. 
Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 442 (1987)(sale-leaseback between related taxpayers lacked 
business purpose, economic substance and reasonable chance of profit, and was designed 
solely to obtain tax benefits); But see, Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 
(1978)(sale-leaseback shall be respected where there is a genuine multi-party transaction 
with economic substance and when compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory reali-
ties and imbued with non-tax considerations) 
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cordingly, the trade or business issue should be put in proper 
perspective. 
A. Trade or Business 
Although the Supreme Court in Snow declined to define the 
term "trade or business," it recently dealt with the concept more 
definitively in Commissioner u. Groetzinger. 54 In Groetzinger, the 
Supreme Court held that a gambler who gambled on a full-time 
basis solely for his own account was in a "trade or business" for 
purposes of the minimum tax provisions of the Code, and presum-
ably for purposes of other provisions of the Code as well. In so 
holding, the Supreme Court rejected the requirement that a tax-
payer must offer goods or services to be considered engaged in a 
trade or business. 1111 Instead, the Court stated: "To be engaged in a 
trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the activity 
with continuity or regularity and . . . the taxpayer's primary pur-
pose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit."116 
In Groetzinger, the taxpayer relied upon his gambling activity 
for his livelihood, although he had certain investment income as 
well. The court indicated that the activities of a gambler could be 
seen in three different ways: (1) as a trade or business, (2) as a 
mere "hobby or a passing fancy" such as "an occasional bet for 
amusement," and (3) as an investment.117 An occasional gambler's 
losses would likely be regarded as non-deductible personal con-
sumption rather than losses incurred in either a trade or business 
or a transaction entered into for profit. The fact that Groetzinger 
gambled for a livelihood took his activity out of the realm of per-
... 480 u.s. 23 (1987). 
•• This view is generally attributed to Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Deputy 
v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940); see also Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 30-31. 
.. 480 U.S. at 35. Although the Supreme Court looked to the taxpayer's "primary pur-
pose" for engaging in the activity for purposes of distinguishing a profit-seeking endeavor 
from pure pleasure, a primary purpose test is not the appropriate test to apply in situations 
where there is no question of pleasure or personal consumption benefits. Rather, in those 
cases and, particularly, in cases involving specific "tax incentive" provisions such as § 17 4, a 
"good faith profit motive" should be the applicable test. See Warren, The Requirement of 
Economic Profit in Tax Motivated Transactions, 59 Taxes 985 (1981). As suggested above, 
§ 17 4 is such a tax incentive provision and was specifically designed to encourage the precise 
behavior engaged in by Research One and its constituent partners. The Department of 
Commerce Blueprints, supra note 27, confirm this conclusion. 
07 480 U.S. at 33-34. 
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sonal amusement and into one of the other two categories of 
activity. 
Moreover, the continuity of Groetzinger's activity and the objec-
tive to make a profit from his personal energies rather than from 
appreciation in property took the activity out of the investment 
category and placed it in the trade or business category. Groetz-
inger was unlike a taxpayer whose "expenses [were] incident to 
caring for one's own investments even though that endeavor is full-
time."58 
The Court, in its words, applied a "common-sense concept of 
what is a trade or business,"59 which required "an examination of 
the facts in each case,"60 however unsatisfactory that may be. To 
the extent this is an unsatisfactory resolution, the Supreme Court 
left repair or revision, if any was needed, to Congress. But, in the 
context of research and development, Congress has already spoken 
through its enactment of section 174. As the Supreme Court recog-
nized in the Snow case and reiterated in Groetzinger, section 
162(a) "is more narrowly written than is Section 174."61 
Thus, a taxpayer satisfies the trade or business test of section 
162 (and, therefore, a fortiori, section 17 4) if (1) the activities are 
undertaken with a profit motive, (2) the activities are sufficiently 
regular and continuous, and (3) the activities constitute a business 
rather than an investment. 62 
Two questions then remain when an activity is undertaken with 
a profit motive. The first is whether the taxpayer's for-profit activ-
ities, even if regular and continuous, constitute an investment 
rather than a business. The second is whether the regular and con-
tinuous activities performed by persons on behalf of the taxpayer 
may be attributable to the taxpayer in establishing that his activ-
ity was regular and continuous so that the taxpayer is engaged in a 
trade or business . 
.. Id. at 31. The Court had previously held that an investor's expenses are not deductible 
as paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business under §162. Higgins v. Commissioner, 
312 U.S. 212 (1941), but see I.R.C. §212(2), which would allow a deduction for such 
expenses. 
•• Id. at 35. 
•• ld. at 36. 
•• Id. at 31, quoting Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 503 (1974). 
•• The Tax Court has already indicated that it will likely adopt this view. See Smith v. 
Commissioner, 91 Curr. Tax Ct. Reg. Dec. (CCH) No. 48, Dec. 45, 110 (1988). See also Lee, 
supra note 22, for a discussion of this view prior to the Snow decision. 
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With regard to whether the taxpayer's activities constitute a 
busine&s or an investment, the Supreme Court in Whipple u. Com-
missioner63 held that the mere purchase and sale of assets for cur-
rent income and appreciation was insufficient to establish a trade 
or business under section 166. In Whipple, the taxpayer was the 
majority shareholder of a bottling corporation to which he had 
loaned substantial amounts of money. When those debts later be-
come worthless, the taxpayer sought an ordinary deduction for the 
losses as business bad debts under section 166. The Commissioner, 
however, viewed the debts as non-business bad debts, which would 
be treated as a short-term capitalloss.64 Thus, like section 174, the 
availability of an ordinary deduction under section 166 depends 
upon a distinction between business activities and investment 
activities. 
The Court held that Whipple was a mere investor and, therefore, 
not engaged in the trade or business of organizing and financing 
corporations: 
Though such activities may produce income, profit or gain in the 
form of dividends or enhancement in the value of an investment, 
this return is distinctive to the process of investing. 
[F]urnishing management and other services to corporations for a 
reward no different than that flowing to an investor . . . is not a 
trade or business. 811 
The Court distinguished those cases in which the taxpayer was 
held to be in business because he received compensation for his 
efforts other than the normal investor's return or because he 
sought to immediately sell the corporations at a profit. Therefore, 
the Whipple case suggests that the existence of a trade or business 
under section 166, as distinguished from an investment, depends 
•• 373 u.s. 193 (1968) . 
.. See generally I.R.C. §166(d)(2). Section 166(d)(2) provides: 
(d) NONBUSINESS DEBT~.-
(2) NONBUSINESS DEBT DEFINED-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term 
"nonbusiness debt" means a debt other than-
(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a trade or 
business of the taxpayer's or 
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayers 
trade or business. 
" Whipple, 373 U.S. at 202. 
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upon a finding that the taxpayer's anticipated profit derived from 
the taxpayer's services rather than market appreciation.88 This test 
can be referred to as the "taxpayer efforts test." 
A similar conclusion can be drawn under section 1221, although 
with less than unanimous support in the case law. In general, prior 
to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, gain from the sale or exchange of a 
capital asset received treatment under the Code preferential to 
that accorded ordinary income. Therefore, the distinction between 
an investment and a trade or business under section 1221 was of 
major importance. A capital asset is broadly defined in section 
1221 of the Code to mean "property held by the taxpayer", but 
specifically excludes, inter alia, "property held by the taxpayer 
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade 
or business. "87 
In George R. Kemon,68 the Tax Court addressed the question of 
whether a partnership which- regularly engaged in the purchase 
and sale of many different securities held those securities as an 
investment or for sale to customers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. The court applied the taxpayer efforts test, stating that the 
critical distinction was the following: 
[T]hose who sell 'to customers' are comparable to a merchant in 
that they purchase their stock in trade, in this case securities, with 
the expectation of reselling at a profit, not because of a rise in 
value during the interval of time between purchase and resale, but 
merely because they have or hope to find a market of buyers who 
will purchase from them at a price in excess of their cost. This 
excess or mark-up represents remuneration for their labors as a 
•• The Court went on to explain that in order to establish a trade or business of organiz-
ing and promoting businesses for resale, "petitioner must show that the entities were organ-
ized with a view to a quick and profitable sale. . .. It is the early re-sale which makes the 
profits income received directly for services." ld. 
In a subsequent case, Deely v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1081, 1092-93 (1980) the Tax Court 
applied and explained the distinctions raised by the Supreme Court in Whipple in the con-
text of §166. The Tax Court focused entirely on whether the taxpayer's anticipated gain was 
to be derived directly for his services: 
In order to establish a business separate from that of his corporations, petitioner 
must sh(lw that the compensation he seeks from his activities is other than the nor-
mal investor's return and that income received is directly for his services rather than 
indirectly through successful operation of the corporate enterprise. 
Id. at 1093. 
67 I.R.C. § 1221(1). 
•• 16 T.C. 1026 (1951). 
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middle man bringing together buyer and seller and performing the 
usual services of retailer or wholesaler of goods.89 
The court described these persons as "dealers" and distinguished 
them from mere "traders" who depend upon such circumstances as 
a rise in value or an advantageous purchase to enable them to sell 
at a price in excess of cost. 70 
Kemon indicates that, at least as applied to securities trading, 
analysis of whether the taxpayers' profits derived in the ordinary 
course of a trade or business under section 1221(1) turns upon the 
same factors discussed above in connection with sections 162 and 
166 of ·the Code. The majority of cases arising under section 
1221(1), however, involve the purchase and sale of real estate. 
These cases seemingly create an inconsistent pattern that cannot 
be reduced to a single statement of the law. Indeed, courts have 
even stated that earlier decisions on essentially the same facts do 
not have precedential effect.71 Nevertheless, in many of these irrec-
oncilable and unpredictable cases, the same three factors emerge 
as the primary means used to distinguish between business activi-
ties and investment activities: namely, the taxpayer must: 1) en-
gage in substantial activity with some degree of continuity; 2) with 
a profit motive; 3) which profit does not depend upon market ap-
preciation.72 To be sure, there are several significant cases decided 
•• Id. at 1032-33. 
70 Id. at 1033; see also Currie v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 185, 199 (1969). 
71 See, e.g., Houston Endowment, Inc. v. United States, 606 F.2d 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1979). 
The single consistent characteristic of opinions concerning real estate sales under Section 
1221(1) is a recitation of factors somewhat different from those used in other areas. Those 
factors include: (1) whether the dispositions of property extend over a long period of time, 
(2) whether there are numerous rates, (3) whether taxpayer made substantial improvements, 
and (4) whether taxpayer had engaged in sales efforts. See Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United 
States, 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). 
72 In Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1980), [hereinafter 
Suburban], cert denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1980), for example, the court noted that, "[i)n the 
principal recent cases, there has always been a conjunction of frequent and substantial sales 
with development activity relating to the properties in dispute." Id. at 176 (citations omit-
ted). This view clearly coincides with the factors used to establish a trade or business under 
other sections of the Code - substantial activity with profits to be derived from taxpayer 
efforts. 
Indeed, even in §1221 cases, the Service has frequently urged the adoption of the taxpayer 
efforts test. In Buono v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 187 (1980), the Tax Court declined to adopt 
that test, although it was urged by the Commissioner. In that case, the taxpayer purchased 
one tract of land, subdivided it, and sold it in bulk to one purchaser. The Tax Court refused 
to impose ordinary income treatment, but based its holding on the lack of continuing sales 
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under Section 1221(1) that genuinely apply a multifactor test 
rather than the taxpayer efforts test.73 However, a close examina-
tion of the precedents in this area reveals that those cases that 
have applied a multifactor test rely heavily on the factors that re-
quire taxpayer efforts, and would be decided the same way if the 
taxpayer efforts test were applied. 
Divergence from the taxpayer efforts test in section 1221 can be 
explained by noting that section 1221 contains requirements in ad-
dition to a finding of a trade or business; namely that the taxpayer 
must sell to customers in the ordinary course of that trade or busi-
ness. The requirement of selling to customers explains the diver-
gence. There is no similar requirement under sections 162, 166 or 
17 4. Indeed, the Supreme Court on several occasions has described 
a "business" as "that which occupies the time, attention and labor 
of real estate. See id. at 200. In addressing the question of taxpayer efforts, the Court 
stated: 
The fact that a substantial amount of appreciation is due to the taxpayer's activities 
is, of course, a significant factor to consider in making this determination. However, 
such does not, standing alone, necessarily require a finding that the taxpayer's prop-
erty is excluded from the capital asset definition by section 1221(1). Id. at 205 n. 25. 
Rather, the focus of the inquiry is whether the taxpayer's activities rise to the level of 
a trade or business. 
Id. at 205. (emphasis added) 
From this statement, one could infer that the number and substantiality of sales is essen-
tially a "busyness" test, requiring some degree of continuity and substantial sales activity in 
order to establish that the taxpayer is in the business of selling real estate. Thus, the two 
factors cited as most important are: 1) substantial activity; and 2) taxpayer improvements. 
This conclusion is further supported by the Tax Court's earlier decision in Bush v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C.M. 340 (1977), affd, 610 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1979). 
In Bush, like Buono, there was only one sale of real estate. However, the taxpayer in Bush 
spent considerable time and energy in acquiring adjacent parcels of real estate, negotiating 
the construction of an apartment building, engaging a design firm and related activities. 
Before any construction occurred, however, the taxpayer sold the entire tract to one buyer. 
In holding that the taxpayers had entered the real estate business, the court focused exclu-
sively on the source of the gain. In spite of a lack of continuing sales activity, the court 
stated that the "key" to its determination was that the gain recognized was primarily attrib-
utable to the taxpayer's efforts in accumulating the parcels into a unified tract. Id. at 349. 
Even in the absence of substantial sales, courts have occasionally found enough activity to 
amount to a trade or business. See, e.g., Jersey Land & Development Corp. v. United States, 
539 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that while taxpayer did not make frequent sales of its 
alleged inventory real estate, the gain was due to taxpayer improvements, not market appre-
ciation, and was taxable as ordinary income). 
73 See, e.g., Suburban, 615 F.2d at 171, which demonstrates that courts frequently decide 
factually indistinguishable cases inconsistently. Compare Commissioner v. Williams, 256 
F.2d 152 (1958) with S & H, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 234 (1982). 
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of men for the purpose of [earning] a livelihood for profit."" 
Thus, an analysis of the trade or business issue under other sec-
tions of the Code reveals that the line between business and in-
vestment appears to be drawn by the element of personal services 
and their impact on the ultimate profit of the activity. A for-profit 
endeavor which depends upon substantial services for its ultimate . 
profit would constitute a business, whereas an endeavor in which 
profit is derived primarily from capital appreciation is more in the 
nature of an investment. The extent of the activity, although a sig-
nificant factor, is not determinative. Even a taxpayer, as in Whip-
ple, who spent substantial amounts of time studying, buying and 
selling investment assets would be a mere investor because the 
profit of the endeavor depends primarily on market appreciation. 
Applying the analysis to section 17 4, it becomes clear that the 
creation of technology through research and development activities 
with an intent to derive a profit should constitute a trade or busi-
ness. Research and development activities involve labor and the 
expenditures of time and effort of a personal service nature in the 
creation of a valuable asset. These activities are far different than 
the investment activities described in the Whipple case and should 
not be characterized as such. 711 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, substantial research and 
development activities conducted for profit clearly fall within the 
concept of a trade or business under any section of the Code, albeit 
the pre-opening phase of a business. The second question that 
must be addressed is whether a taxpayer can satisfy this require-
ment if all, or substantially all, of the activity is conducted by an 
independent contractor on behalf of the taxpayer. Clearly, if the 
taxpayer himself were conducting all of the research activities, 
those activities would be sufficient to place the taxpayer in the 
74 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911). 
•• A finding of sufficient taxpayer efforts for a trade or business, however, should not 
overcome the additional qualification in the context of §162 that pre-opening expenses are 
not deductible, and it would appear to be an unwarranted extension of the holding in the 
Groetzinger case to contend otherwise. Rather, pre-opening expenses represent one aspect 
of capitalization, which was not at issue in the Groetzinger case. One strongly suspects that 
the non-allowability of a current deduction for pre-opening expenses will continue to remain 
intact in the tax law. Nevertheless, as long as research activity would satisfy the trade or 
business requirement of Groetzinger, those research expenses would be deductible under 
§ 17 4, because § 17 4 represents a statutory exception to the pre-opening expense limitation of 
§162. 
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pre-opening stage of a trade or business, regardless of whether the 
taxpayer was ever going to manufacture products. Can the activi-
ties of an independent contractor of the taxpayer also satisfy this 
requirement? 
The Treasury's regulations in the context of section 17 4 answer 
the question affirmatively and leave no room for doubt. In contrast 
to the current pattern of voluminous regulations with myriads of 
exceptions, the regulations issued under section 174 are refresh-
ingly clear and simple. These regulations expressly contemplate 
the use of research contractors to perform the research and devel-
opment work for the taxpayer who is entitled to the section 174 
deduction. The regulations, in part, provide as follows: 
The provisions of this Section apply not only to costs paid or in-
curred by the taxpayer for research or experimentation undertaken 
directly by him but also to expenditures paid or incurred for re-
search or experimentation carried on in his behalf by another per-
son or organization (such as a research institute, foundation, engi-
neering company, or similar contractor).76 
Although under other sections of the Code, most notably section 
1221, courts often distinguish between an independent contractor 
and an agent based upon the degree of taxpayer control, 77 this dis-
tinction should not be the case under section 17 4. 78 
76 Treas. Reg. §1.174-2(a)(2). See also Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, and Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 8,614,004 (November 25, 1985) evidencing the Service's view that, at least under §174, 
the activities of an independent contractor may be attributed to the taxpayer. 
77 Under §1221, the taxpayer who owns land to be subdivided and who procures the ser-
vices of a sales agent to sell the subdivided lots to customers will generally recognize ordi-
nary income on the sale because the property will be regarded as held by the taxpayer for 
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business. The taxpayer generally 
cannot insulate himself from that result by using a sales agent in lieu of actively soliciting 
sales himself. 
In Achong v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 445, (9th Cir. 1957), the court attributed the activi-
ties of a broker to the taxpayer when the taxpayer had the right to approve the final subdi-
vision plans and the cost of improvements. Id. at 447. In that case, lot prices were to be 
agreed upon by the taxpayer and the broker; the taxpayer bore all expenses of developing 
and improving the property; and the broker's books were open to inspection. Id. at 446. See 
also Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 419 (5th Cir. 1976) , cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 819 (1976)(the brokers "did not so completely take charge ... as to permit the 
[taxpayer) to wall itself off legally from their activities."). 
78 The Tax Court in Smith v. Commissioner, 91 Curr. Tax Ct. Reg. Dec. (CCH) No. 48, 
Dec. 45, 110 (1988), however, recently left this question-open, but suggested in an offhanded 
way that direct taxpayer involvement may be required under the trade or business require-
ment of §174, where the taxpayer's profit motive was questionable. See also Drobny v. Corn-
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Most of the cases under section 1221 that distinguish between an 
agent and an independent contractor on the basis of taxpayer con-
trol are not applicable to cases involving section 17 4. They can be 
explained by reference to the additional requirement in section 
1221 that property be held for "sale to customers." To find a capi-
tal asset under section 1221, one must conclude that the customers 
are those of the selling agent and not the owner of the property. 
The amount of taxpayer control over the agent is probative of this 
question. The greater the owner's control, the more likely it will be 
that the prospective purchasers are the owner's customers.79 
missioner, 86 T.C. 1326, 1343-48 (1986). Both of these cases suggested the significance of 
direct taxpayer involvement in the context of sham transactions devoid of economic sub-
stance, indicating that lack of taxpayer control over management of the activity is a factor 
supporting a finding of sham, but otherwise has no impact on the technical requirements of 
trade or business. 
70 In Bauschard v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1960), even though the taxpayer 
was totally "walled-off' from the developer, the court attributed the developer's activities to 
the taxpayer. Id. at 118. The taxpayer, a Catholic priest, purchased the property in issue 
along with the local pharmacist in order to prevent the construction of a low cost housing 
development in their residential community. Title to the property was taken in the name of 
two trustees. The trustees leased the property to a real estate developer for five years. It was 
understood that during the term of the lease the developer intended to subdivide and im-
prove the property at his own expense. The trustees also granted the developer an option to 
purchase any or all of the lots at an undetermined price. The developer organized a corpora-
tion to which he assigned his interest in the lease. The corporation then subdivided and 
improved the property and solicited sales of the lots. As each lot was sold by the corpora-
tion, the trustees signed a deed and thereby transferred title directly to the purchaser. In 
all, there were sixty-five separate sales involving twenty-three purchasers. ld. at 117. Even 
though the property was under option to the developer for a fixed price, and the taxpayer 
had no control over the developer, the court held that the property was held by the taxpayer 
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. See id. at 118. 
Interestingly, the court stated that the taxpayer's single sale argument might have merit if 
the option for the property as a whole had been exercised before the development and sale 
of the lots. See id. However, in Voss v. United States, 329 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1964), the 
taxpayer engaged a developer to subdivide a sixty-acre parcel and improve the subdivision 
with streets and utilities. The developer was solely responsible for marketing and selling the 
lots and all of the improvement expenses were paid out of the sales proceeds. The court 
declined to attribute the developer's activities to the petitioner because in its view the de-
veloper was an independent contractor as opposed to an agent. In so holding, the court 
emphasized that the developer had total discretion in setting the prices and incurring ex-
penses. The taxpayer's only activity was to sign the deeds to transfer title. See id. at 167. 
Indeed, the facts of Bauschard are analogous to the typical research and development 
arrangement where a taxpayer which owns rights in basic technology essentially engages an 
outside firm to perform further development work and grants an option to the research 
contractor to purchase the new developments. Under Bauschard, as long as the option is not 
exercised prior to the development, the activities of the contractor should be attributed to 
the taxpayer. Conversely, if the option is exercised and a sale takes place prior to the devel-
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Furthermore, the language of the regulations clearly indicates 
that the activities of an independent research contractor should be 
attributed to the taxpayer under section 17 4 without regard to the 
degree of the taxpayer's control over the contractor. It is almost 
axiomatic that a taxpayer may conduct his business through an 
agent and nevertheless be engaged in business. 80 
Indeed, the Treasury's recently issued regulations under section 
355 indicate acceptance of this view. In general, section 355 per-
mits a corporation to distribute or "spin-off' stock in an another 
corporation which it controls to its shareholders without recogni-
tion of gain to itself or to the recipient shareholders, if the specific 
requirements of the section are satisfied. One of the requirements 
is that both the distributing corporation and the controlled corpo-
ration must be engaged in the "active conduct of a trade or busi-
ness" immediately after the distribution.81 The new regulations in-
terpret this requirement, in part, by defining trade or business as 
"a specific group of activities that are being carried on by the cor-
poration for the purpose of earning income for profit, and the ac-
tivities included in such group include every operation that forms a 
part of, or a step in, the process of earning income or profit .... "82 
The active conduct of a trade or business, which is the actual re-
quirement under section 355 for tax-free treatment, provides that 
each corporation must not only have a trade or business, but also 
that "the corporation is required itself to perform active and sub-
stantial management and operational functions. Generally, activi-
ties performed by the corporation itself do not include activities 
performed by persons outside the corporation, including indepen-
dent contractors."83 It follows, therefore, that the Treasury's posi-
tion regarding the definition of trade or business within the mean-
ing of section 355 is consistent with case law and permits business 
functions to be conducted by an independent contractor on behalf 
opment work, the activities of the "agent" are no longer on behalf of the principal and 
therefore cannot be attributed to the principal. The latter situation was precisely the situa· 
tion in Green v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 667, 691 (1984) and logically justifies the court's 
holding in that case. 
•• See Reiner v. United States, 222 F.2d 770, 771 (7th Cir. 1955); Kaltreider v. Commis-
sioner, 255 F.2d 833, 838 (3rd Cir. 1958). 
•• I.R.C. §355(a)(1)(C) and (b)(1). 
•• Treas. Reg. §1.355-3(b)(2)(ii). 
•• Treas. Reg. §1.355-3(b)(2)(iii). 
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of the taxpayer. 
Moreover, the recent enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
confirms that an owner of a business need not be active to be en-
gaged in a trade or business. Section 469, enacted under the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, contains the passive activity loss rules which 
deals, in part, with the tax treatment of a taxpayer who has only 
minor involvement in a trade or business. 8 " In substance, these 
rules preclude a taxpayer from using losses from a passive activity 
("passive losses") to offset nonpassive income. Nonpassive income 
includes income from salaries, investments and other sources other 
than from passive activities. 86 
A passive activity is defined, in part, as "[a]ny activity which 
involves the conduct of any trade or business, and in which the 
taxpayer does not materially participate."86 A taxpayer is "treated 
as materially participating in an activity only if the taxpayer is in-
volved in the operations of the activity on a basis which is (A) reg-
ular, (B) continuous and (C) substantial."87 The section clearly 
contemplates, therefore, that even though an activity may be con-
ducted on behalf of a taxpayer, if the activity constitutes a trade or 
business, it is sufficient to qualify the taxpayer as carrying on a 
trade or business.88 The entire concept upon which the passive ac-
tivity loss rules are based would be meaningless if a taxpayer could 
be precluded from carrying on a trade or business by virtue of the 
taxpayer's lack of personal involvement in performing services. 
B. Application of the Suggested Analysis to a Basic 
Hypothetical Case 
A hypothetical case, modeled on the Green case,89 can be studied 
in light of the foregoing discussion of trade or business to demon-
•• I.R.C. §469. 
•• See generally Goldberg, The Passive Activity Loss Rules: Planning Considerations, 
Techniques, and a Foray into Never-Never Land, 15 J. Real Est. Tax'n 3 (1987)(describing 
the scope and policy objectives of Section 469). 
•• I.R.C. §469(c)(1). 
87 Section 469(h). It is also interesting to note that §469(c)(5) specifically includes in the 
term "trade or business" for purposes of the section any activity involving research or ex-
perimentation within the meaning of §174. 
88 For example, the sole proprietor of a twenty-person law firm who does no legal work 
himself is of course engaged in a trade or business as long as he derives the profits from the 
firm's trade or business activities. 
•• See Green v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 667 (1984). 
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strate that the analysis suggested in this paper is the proper analy-
sis. The study will demonstrate the weakness of the Service's cur-
rent position and the inexactitude of recent judicial analysis. The 
hypothetical will also facilitate a critical examination of the factors 
which recent courts have highlighted as significant in holding that 
research expenses were not in connection with a trade or business. 
Assume a partnership (the "Partnership") contracts with an in-
dependent contractor (the "Research Company") to perform re-
search for the Partnership under a research contract. Under the 
agreement, ownership of, and all rights to, the technology devel-
oped (the "New Technology") by the Research Company belong to 
the Partnership as developed. All patents will be in the name of 
the Partnership. 
A prospective licensee (the "Licensee") would like to license the 
technology on an exclusive worldwide basis and the Partnership is 
well aware of this desire. Assume also that the bona fides of the 
research are beyond question and therefore not at issue. Finally, 
assume that all research expenditures by the Partnership to the 
Research Company are made in cash. 
Under the facts of the hypothetical, the Partnership should be 
entitled to a current deduction under section 17 4 for its payments 
to the Research Company. This conclusion is based squarely on the 
Supreme Court's holding in Snow v. Commissioner.90 
The Service has indicated that it will challenge the Partnership's 
research and development expenses in cases like that presented by 
the hypothetical as not being in connection with a trade or busi-
ness.91 The Service may contend that the Partnership never "en-
gaged in" a trade or business because it never sold physical prod-
ucts or actively attempted to license the New Technology to 
multiple licensees on a nonexclusive basis. On the contrary, by hir-
ing the Research Company to conduct research for the creation of 
New Technology and intending to exploit the New Technology for 
profit through licensing, the Partnership would satisfy the trade or 
business requirement of section 17 4. 
Nevertheless, the Service and several courts have somehow 
found significance in various extraneous factors present in the hy-
•• 416 u.s. 500, 504 (1974). 
•• See supra notes 29 to 40 and accompanying text. 
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potheticaP2 These factors include the following: (1) the general 
partner of the Partnership was not an inventor by trade; (2) all of 
the actual research work was done by an independent contractor 
rather than employees of the Partnership; (3) the Partnership 
never intended to, and indeed never did, manufacture or sell prod-
ucts using the technology; (4) the licensee of the technology was 
the same company or an affiliate of the company hired to perform 
the research (and, perhaps, that company was granted a bona fide 
option to license the technology); and (5) the transaction somehow 
appears "abusive."98 These factors, however, have no independent 
significance in the context of section 17 4. 
(1) The General Partner Is Not an Inventor; and 
(2) All of the Actual Work Is Done by an Independent 
Contractor. 
Assume that the Partnership had hired the Research Company 
to perform research services for the Partnership. Developments 
and advances by the Research Company would be for the account 
of the Partnership and any patents or technology developed would 
belong to the Partnership. The activities of the Research Company 
should be imputed to the Partnership as if the general partner of 
the Partnership had performed that activity. Otherwise, juridical 
entities like partnerships and corporations could never be deemed 
to be engaged in a trade or business because these entities can only 
act through agents. Indeed, as discussed above, the Treasury regu-
lations are abundantly clear that a taxpayer is entitled to the de-
duction under section 17 4 for amounts expended by the taxpayer 
for research services performed on the taxpayer's behalf.9" The de-
duction is available even if the Partnership's intention is to dispose 
of the technology in a one-shot transaction. The critical inquiry is 
the nature of the activity and not the taxpayer's personal involve-
ment in the activity. 
Reversing the situation, assume that the general partner is an. 
inventor. Assume further that the technology has been licensed to 
•• See, e.g., Levin v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 698, 725-28 (1986), affd, 832 F.2d 403 (7th 
Cir. 1987). 
•• See supra notes 28 to 39 and accompanying text. 
04 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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the Licensee before the research has been undertaken. In this situ-
ation, the Partnership will be engaged in research activities be-
cause of the work of the general partner-inventor. The Partner-
ship, however, will be engaging in those activities on behalf of 
someone else, namely the Licensee, who owns the technology as it 
is developed. In this capacity, the Partnership becomes similar to 
the Research Company in the initial hypothetical. Any expenses 
that the Partnership incurs will be expenses under section 162 of 
the Code because it will be carrying on the business of performing 
research for another. The nature of the activities as research in the 
experimental sense would be treated no differently than if the 
Partnership were engaged in constructing a house under contract 
with a customer. The research nature of the activity would be irrel-
evant to the Partnership's deductibility of the expenses. 
Similarly, the Licensee, the company for whom the Partnership 
is working, has hired the Partnership to perform research activities 
for it. The regulations under section 17 4 clearly contemplate that 
the Licensee, having research performed on its behalf, should be 
entitled to the deduction under section 174 rather than being re-
quired to capitalize these expenses and add them to the basis of 
any technology or patent that is developed.911 Section 174 is 
designed to provide a current deduction for expenditures that 
would ordinarily be capitalized under general capitalization princi-
ples or the principle of pre-opening expense. 96 The Partnership 
would never be required to capitalize its costs of performing re-
search services for another. Absent section 174, the employing 
company, however, would be required to capitalize those expendi-
tures. Therefore, section 17 4 is available only to the employing 
company to convert its otherwise capitalized expenditure to a cur-
rently deductible expense. 
Thus, the technical background and white lab coat attire of the 
general partner does not go to the question of whether the research 
and development expense deduction is that of the Partnership. 
Nor can it preserve the deduction for the Pctrtnership if the Part-
nership is performing those services on behalf of someone else. It is 
irrelevant under section 17 4 that the owner of the technology is 
also the inventor. Hiring employees or an independent contractor 
•• See id. 
98 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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to perform research services for the owner is sufficient to entitle 
the partnership to the deduction for qualifying expenditures under 
section 17 4. 
3. The Partnership Never Intended, and Indeed Never Did, 
Manufacture or Sell Products Using the Technology. 
The fact that the Partnership never intended to manufacture a 
product with the technology is also irrelevant. As long as the Part-
nership does not pre-license the technology to the Licensee, either 
as a legal or practical matter, the Partnership should be entitled to 
the research and development deduction under section 17 4 of the 
Code because the research and development would be done on the 
Partnership's behalf. The deduction should be allowed regardless 
of whether the research activities were successful and the Partner-
ship manufactures the product, whether the technology is success-
ful and the Partnership licenses the technology to another firm to 
manufacture the product, or whether the research was a failure so 
that manufacturing was not pursued. 
If the deduction hinged on whether manufacturing ultimately 
commenced, then only those companies that were successful in 
pursuing research and development would be entitled to deduct 
their research expenses. Start-up companies would be denied a de-
duction unless the technology proved economically exploitable, 
which is precisely what Justice Douglas was concerned about in the 
Snow case.97 Under such a construction, only well-financed compa-
nies that had ongoing sales could be assured of a deduction. 
Moreover, only research performed by companies that would ul-
timately use the technology to manufacture products or perform 
services would be allowed a deduction under this restricted view of 
section 174. Thus, a high-tech research company that had insuffi-
cient capital to start a manufacturing facility which instead li-
censed its technology to large airplane or automobile manufactur-
ers could never be allowed a section 17 4 deduction because it 
would never be in any trade or business other than conducting 
research. 
Nor should developing the technology with the intention of 
granting an exclusive license after the technology was developed 
07 See Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 503-04 (1974). 
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preclude a section 174 deduction on the theory that there was in-
sufficient marketing activity. Rather, the section 174 deduction 
should be allowed because the Partnership is in the trade or busi-
ness while the research is being conducted. The period before li-
censing might be considered the pre-opening phase of the trade or 
business. But, section 174 was designed to grant a deduction for 
expenses in the pre-opening phase for small companies that were 
not yet well established. 98 
If a taxpayer's intention to exploit the technology in a particular 
way were relevant, at what point would one determine whether the 
taxpayer would use the technology in a trade or business? Would 
one have to wait to see whether the taxpayer ever commenced to 
"carry on" a trade or business before allowing the research and 
development deduction, even though the research expenses may 
have been made several years before the sales activity begins? 
Quite the contrary must be true. Under the annual accounting sys-
tem, each year must stand on its own. It would be inconsistent 
with general tax accounting principles to force a taxpayer to hold 
open his tax year until it is certain he has commenced to "carry 
on" a trade or business, in the government's view, in subsequent 
years. The research could last four or five years, in which event the 
statute of limitations would have closed on the first year of re-
search. The proper year for the deduction is the year in which the 
expense was paid or incurred, and there is no specific statutory 
provision for holding open the statute of limitations on research 
expenses. 
Furthermore, to deny the deduction to the Partnership as the 
owner of the technology would preclude anyone from getting the 
deduction. None of the other players has any claim to it. The Re-
search Company is simply performing services for another and the 
Licensee is simply purchasing technology and must capitalize its 
cost. 99 If research is performed, a deduction under section 17 4 
should be available, and the taxpayer on behalf of whom the re-
•• See id. 
•• See Treas. Reg. §1.174-2(a)(2). See also Treas. Reg. §1.174-2(a)(3), Example (3), which 
provides that no deduction for research expenditures will be allowed where the taxpayer 
hires another to develop a specific product under a performance guarantee, since the tax-
payer has not incurred any risk. For a discussion of the risk element, See Natbony, Tax 
Shelters and Section 174: Research and Experimental Expenditures in the Tax Shelter Con-
text, 4 J. Tax'n lnv. 19, 27 (1986). 
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search is done is the most appropriate candidate to receive the 
deduction. 
Thus, the test of trade or business should look to who owns the 
technology as the technology is developed. Unlike the Green case 
and its progeny, the taxpayer in Snow owned the technology as it 
was being developed and had not sold it prior to the research work 
being done. In all subsequent Commissioner victories on this issue, 
that was not the case. 
Some courts, however, have suggested that one should look to 
the taxpayer's intent as to whether they planned to enter into the 
business of manufacturing products or performing services using 
the technology. Such an approach would unduly restrict the con-
cept of "trade or business," in contravention of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Groetzinger which rejected the requirement 
that taxpayers must offer goods or services to be in a trade or 
business. 100 
4. The Licensee of the Technology is the Same Company or an 
Affiliate of the Company Hired to Perform the Research. 
The identity of the licensee of the technology and the person 
performing the actual research work at first blush would seem to 
indicate that the Partnership, situated between the two, is merely 
providing financing. But, suppose the arrangement begins with the 
Partnership hiring the Research Company to perform research ser-
vices. Assume also that at some time after the initial agreement, 
the Research Company becomes enamored of the technology being 
developed and offers to purchase the technology through a license 
providing royalty payments to the Partnership. Under these cir-
cumstances, the license of the technology to the Research Com-
pany should have no effect on the initial deductibility of the re-
search and development expenditures under section 17 4 because at 
the time these expenditures were made, they· represented expenses 
for research performed on behalf of the Partnership, which owned 
all rights to the technology. 
In this situation, there are two transactions occurring. First, 
under the research contract, the Research Company performed the 
research services for the Partnership for a fee. The second transac-
100 480 u.s. 23, 35 (1987). 
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tion occurs under the license agreement through which the Part-
nership licensed the technology back to the Research Company. As 
long as these two transactions were separate transactions and the 
license agreement occurred after the technology was developed, the 
subsequent license agreement should have no effect on the deduct-
ibility of fees for research services paid by the Partnership. 
Now, suppose that at the time the research work was being per-
formed, the Partnership had already licensed the technology to be 
developed back to the Research Company. The Partnership would 
not be entitled to a deduction under section 17 4 because the Part-
nership never had rights to the technology and the technology was 
not developed on the Partnership's behalf. This result is the hold-
ing of the Green case and the cases following Green. 101 
In Green and the cases which followed, the Service challenged 
the taxpayer's deductions for research and development expenses 
because these expenditures related to a period after the date of the 
disposition of the inventions to the licensee.102 The courts held 
that the exclusive license agreement between the taxpayer and the 
licensee constituted a sale of those inventions. Because the sale 
took place before the taxpayer incurred the research and develop-
ment expenditures, the research costs were not expended on the 
taxpayer's behalf. Rather, the expenditures represented, in the 
courts' view, an acquisition cost of the licensee's promise to pay a 
stream of royalties to the taxpayer. 103 All of these cases indicate 
that a: taxpayer's entitlement to a research and development de-
duction under section 17 4 will depend on whether that taxpayer 
has, in effect, sold (i.e., licensed on an exclusive basis) the technol-
ogy prior to incurring the research expenses. 104 
In contrast, the Partnership in the hypothetical owned the new 
technology as it was developed. It was assigned all of the patents to 
the new technology as they were obtained. It had all rights to that 
technology, and was not obligated to license the technology to any-
one. In that situation, the separate identities of the Research Com-
pany and Licensee would make it clear that the research and li-
censing agreements were separate transactions. 
101 See supra notes 28 to 39 and accompanying text. 
102 See id. 
10~ See id. 
104 See id. 
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Although, as a technical matter, the identity of the Research 
Company and the Licensee is legally irrelevant, as a practical mat-
ter, the identity causes one to question whether the two transac-
tions are interrelated and not separate. Assume now that the Part-
nership entered into the research contract with the Research 
Company and also granted the Research Company an option to ac-
quire the technology in the future, after the technology was devel-
oped. The existence of the option should be irrelevant to the treat-
ment of the expenditures unless the option is viewed, in substance, 
as a sale at the time of grant. The appropriateness of that view 
depends upon the legal and tax nature of an option. 
The overwhelming case law authority holds that an option is not 
a sale and does not transfer ownership of the subject property for 
tax purposes. 106 However, if the option were certain of being exer-
cised, such as when the option is exercisable at a nominal price, 
then it would be considered a sale for tax purposes and not truly 
an option.106 Thus, as long as the exercise is not a foregone conclu-
sion, any sale brought about by exercise of the option should be 
viewed as an independent transaction. 
The granting of an option to license the technology to the Re-
search Company, however, may raise practical factual questions. 
These factual questions can be dispelled if, during the time the 
technology is being developed, there are no side agreements to li-
100 See Koch v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 71, 88 (1976), acq. 1980-2 C.B. 1. The grantor is 
taxed when the option is exercised or lapses. At the time of exercise of the option, the 
transaction constitutes a completed sale. See Commissioner v. Dill Co., 294 F.2d 291, 300-01 
(3d Cir. 1961); See Hunter v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cir. 1944); Virginia Iron, 
Coal, Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 195, aff'd, 99 F.2d 919, 921 (4th Cir. 1938), cert. 
denied, 307 U.S. 630 (1939). The principal is also followed by the Internal Revenue Service. 
See Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B. 279; Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265. Moreover, even 
where the amount of the option payment exceeds the basis of the underlying property (so 
that the optionor will receive a profit in any event), the courts have consistently taken the 
position that the grant of the option is not a sale of the underlying property and is not a 
taxable event. See, e.g., Hunter v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1944); Commis-
sioner v. Dill Co., 294 F.2d 291, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1961); Hicks v. Commissioner, 37 
T.C.M.(CCH) 1540, 1546 (1978); Helmer v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 727, 730-31 (1975). 
'oe Property Growth Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1072, 1075 (1988); Diamond 
v. Commissioner, 92 Curr. Tax Ct. Reg. Dec. (CCH) No. 25, Dec. 45,497 (1989)(deduction 
denied when option could be exercised wwithout cost and partnership was otherwise pre-
cluded from obtaining a patent for the device developed); Moore v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 
1989-38 (January 24, 1989)(Partnership denied dedusctions under §174 for suspect research 
in a transaction devoid of profit motive to the partnership and in which the option to li-
cense the resulting technology was prearranged or a foregone conclusion). 
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cense and the technology is exploitable by someone other than the 
Research Company-Licensee. 
Of course, by the granting of the option, the Partnership has 
transferred away some of the potential upside of the transaction. 
The transfer of some upside potential, however, occurs in all op-
tion situations and is not unique to the research situation. The 
transfer of upside potential should have no effect on the availabil-
ity of research and development expense deductions. The existence 
of the option, therefore, is legally irrelevant to an analysis of de-
ductions under section 17 4. 
To be sure, a form of pre-licensing may be deemed to take place 
without a formal license agreement if the technology to be devel-
oped was so restricted or of so limited use as to be unsalable to 
anyone but the prospective licensee. 107 In that event, the ultimate 
licensing to the prospective licensee may be regarded as so certain 
as to preclude the nominal owner from having a full ownership in-
terest in the technology. However, the prospective Licensee, which 
would typically be the Research Company, would not yet have the 
full ownership interest either. Therefore, it would be inappropriate 
to treat the technology as pre-licensed to that Licensee. 
If it is clear at the inception of the research that the technology 
will not be exploitable by someone other than the Research Com-
pany-Licensee, but it has not been pre-licensed, then the relation-
ship between the Partnership and the Research Company is best 
characterized as a joint venture. The allocation of deductions for 
research and development expenses between the Partnership and 
the Research Company would be governed by section 704(b) of the 
Code and the regulations thereunder, which, in substance, allocate 
the deductions on the basis of who bears the risk of economic loss 
from unsuccessful research. 108 In cases in which the Partnership 
contributed money for the research, the Partnership would be enti-
tled to the allocation of deductions attributable to the 
contributions. 
The definition of a joint venture is well established in the opin-
ions of the Tax Court. A joint venture has been defined as "a spe-
cial combination of two or more persons, where in some specific 
venture a profit is jointly sought without any actual partnership or 
107 See generally notes 102 to 104 and accompanying text. 
108 I.R.C. §704(b). 
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corporate designation."109 As the Court stated in Podell v. Com-
missioner, the elements of a joint venture are: 
(a) a contract (express or implied) showing that it was the intent of 
the parties that a business venture be established; (b) an agree-
ment for joint control and proprietorship; (c) a contribution of 
money, property and/or services by the joint venturers; and (d) a 
sharing of profits but not necessarily losses: 110 
In Bussing v. Commissioner, m the taxpayer participated in a 
multi-party equipment leasing arrangement in which the taxpayer 
acquired an interest in copying equipment encumbered by a secur-
ity interest and a triple net lease. The taxpayer, Bussing, paid 
$10,000 in cash and $31,566 in promissory notes as a downpayment 
with the balance of the purchase price offset by the rental income. 
However, Bussing was entitled to a small percentage of any sub-
lease rents received from the seller during the last three years of 
any sublease. Bussing also entered into a marketing agreement ap-
pointing the seller as his agent in marketing the equipment and in 
daily management decisions. For these services, the seller was enti-
tled to receive 15% of the proceeds from any sale or lease of the 
equipment plus marketing costs. 
Under these facts, the Tax Court concluded that Bussing and his 
seller/agent entered into a joint venture: 
The several agreements executed by and between Bussing and [the 
seller/agent], viewed as a whole, evidence an intent to join together 
in a transaction in order to share profits and losses. First, each 
party has contributed something of value to the venture - peti-
tioner, his capital; AG, its services, business contacts and the 
equipment subject to encumbrances. Second, each party has a sig-
nificant interest in the rental and residual value of the equipment. 
AG's loan to Handlesbank is paid down by Continentale's rent. 
AG's "rent" to Bussing equals Bussing's "loan" payments to AG. 
No losses are allocated to AG, but instead are allocated to Bussing 
and the other investors in accordance with the interest acquired by 
each. The substance of this transaction is that the parties are en-
gaged in a joint venture - to invest in, lease and market the 
109 Podell v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 429, 431 (1970) (quoting Haley v. Commissioner, 203 
F.2d 815, 818 (5th Cir. 1953)). 
110 Id., citing Flanders v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 935 (N.D. Cal. 1959), and Tate v. 
Knox, 131 F.Supp. 514 (D. Minn. 1955). 
111 88 T.C. 449 (1987). 
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equipment.112 
If at the inception of the research the Partnership were economi-
cally but not legally compelled to enter into a license agreement 
pursuant to which it would share profits from the technology, but 
the Research Company had no right to force the Partnership to 
sell or license the technology, then joint venture characterization 
would be appropriate. The arrangement and the several agree-
ments executed by and between the Partnership and the Research 
Company, viewed as a whole, would evidence an intent to join to-
gether in a transaction to share profits and losses. First, each party 
would have contributed something of value to the venture: as to 
the Partnership, capital and marketing assistance; as to the Re-
search Company, its services, experience, and the old technology. 
Second, each party would have a significant interest in the success-
ful marketing of the technology. If the Research Company exer-
cised its option, it would benefit from the revenues generated by 
the sublicensing of the technology. The Partnership in turn would 
receive royalty payments. Thus, if the Partnership were economi-
cally compelled to license the technology to the Research Com-
pany, under Bussing and Podell, the Partnership and the Research 
Company could be viewed as having entered into a joint venture to 
develop and exploit the new technology.113 
In two cases under section 17 4, courts have addressed the issue 
of the conditions under which a joint venture is formed between a 
capital participant and a research participant. In Cleveland v. 
Commissioner,w· the Fourth Circuit held that a joint venture was 
formed upon the execution of a trust agreement. The agreement 
provided that (1) the inventor would devote his full time efforts to 
research and development; (2) the investor would contribute all of 
the necessary funds; and (3) that the invention was jointly owned 
and profits would be shared equally. The investor, Cleveland, pro-
vided capital to the venture and testified that he met weekly with 
the inventor to discuss the progress of the research. All of the re-
search was performed and controlled by the inventor. Although the 
agreement did not purport to create a joint venture, the court held 
that "the effect of the contractual provisions, considered as a 
111 Id. at 461-62 (citations omitted). 
113 See id.; Podell, 55 T.C. 429, 31. 
114 34 T.C. 517 (1960), affd in part, rev'd in part, 297 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1961). 
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whole, is to make the parties equal participants in a joint 
venture. "115 
In a more recent case, Green v. Commissioner, 116 the Tax Court 
ruled on the conditions under which it would hold that a joint ven-
ture had not been formed. In contrast to .Cleveland, the investor in 
Green granted an exclusive license to the research contractor con-
temporaneous with the research and development agreement. As a 
result, the capital participant never actually had ownership rights 
in any new technology. As the Tax Court noted: 
The present case is distinguishable from Cleveland because 
LaSala, unlike the joint venture in Cleveland, had sold to NPDC 
all its rights to any product that might result from the research, 
and after the sale, LaSala, u,nlike the joint venture in Cleveland, 
was not engaged in the business of developing the product.117 
Again, it appears that the only relevant factor in determining 
entitlement to the section 17 4 deduction in the hypothetical is 
whether the research was done on behalf of the Partnership. None 
of the other factors mentioned by courts or the Service has inde-
pendent significance. 
5. Amorphous Feeling of Abuse of the Tax System. 
The Service apparently sees the Partnership in the hypothetical 
as abusive when the situation is presented in the form of a syndi-
cated "tax shelter."118 The Service's view especially would be the 
case if the research services were not paid for in cash but rather 
were funded with a deferred payment obligation. But, consider the 
"abusive" tax shelter that took place in Snow. In Snow, research 
· and development deductions were allowed to individuals at their 
relatively high rates of tax in the mid-1960s.119 But, when it came 
time to generate income, the parties put the technology into a cor-
poration so that the income would be taxed at the relatively low 
corporate rates applicable at that time.120 This aspect of the case 
110 ld. at 173. 
116 83 T.C. 667 (1984). Green is discussed in detail at supra note 1 and notes 28 to 39. 
117 Id. at 691. 
116 See supra notes 28 to 39 and accompanying text. 
119 The highest marginal rate of tax for individuals in 1960 was 87%. Stan. Fed. Tax Rep. 
(CCH) 'il152, p. 7952. 
120 The highest marginal corporate rate at that time was 52%. ld. at 11156, p. 7968. 
HeinOnline -- 8 Va. Tax Rev. 901 1988-1989
1989] Unauthorized Snow Removal 901 
wa~ not discussed by any of the courts in the Snow case, and for 
good reason - it was irrelevant to the section 17 4 issue - just as 
the Commissioner's perception of abuse in the syndicated tax shel-
ter context is irrelevant to the trade or business issue. 
The Snow case clearly holds that research and development ex-
penses are deductible even if incurred in the pre-opening phase of 
a trade or business. The Partnership in the hypothetical is in the 
pre-opening phase because a sufficient amount of continuous ongo-
ing activity is being conducted on its behalf by the Research Com-
pany with the intent to earn a profit. As long as the research is 
done on behalf of the Partnership, none of the other factors that 
may be urged by the Service or referred to by courts in dicta has 
any independent significance. 
In dealing with research and development cases, the Service ap-
pears to be overly influenced by pure revenue considerations and a 
dislike for tax advantaged transactions. Nonetheless, as the Tax 
Court has noted in another case: 
[W]e should not disregard the existence of an asset for which Con-
gress intended tax advantages merely because the parties at-
tempted to maximize the advantage of those benefits for one of the 
parties to a transaction. [The Commissioner] should recognize that 
in instances where there are not shams and depreciable assets ex-
ist, some person or entity is entitled to the intended tax 
advantages.121 
This observation is no less applicable to deductions under sec-
tion 174. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Green case and its progeny, by applying the incorrect ra-
tionale in reaching a correct result, have done the tax law a disser-
vice. Bolstered by these cases, the Service has engaged in unautho-
rized "Snow removal" by ignoring the Supreme Court's position in 
Snow, the importance of the "on behalf of' phrase in the Trea-
sury's own regulations and the function which section 17 4 performs 
in the tax law. Admittedly, the Service has done this in cases 
colored by apparently meritless research designed primarily, if not 
exclusively, to generate tax deductions for investors. 
111 Leahy v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 56, 72 (1986). 
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In adjudicating those cases, however, the Courts have failed to 
provide guidance for other situations. They should have looked 
past the cases that they were actually deciding and taken care that 
their opinions could not be interpreted so broadly as to cut the 
heart out of section 17 4 and the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
that section. This article has provided a suggested analysis of the 
"trade or business" issue which should allow the courts and the 
Service to sharpen their focus on the truly abusive aspects of cases 
which will arise. To proceed in any other way introduces unwar-
ranted uncertainty to already risky business decisions involving re-
search and development. As important, imprecise opinions also 
create an unhealthy climate for analyzing cases involving other tax 
incentive provisions. 
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